COMPARABILITY, DECISION THEORY AND THE AHP

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Published Dec 21, 2015
Sibs von Solms

Abstract

Saaty (2011) briefly discusses the three basic laws of Aristotelian logic and suggests a fourth, which he calls the Law of Comparisons.  He argues that comparison is both relevant and essential to the other three laws and, in fact, precedes them.  This view - comparativism - is however, not without criticism.  Here we present a more comprehensive discussion of various problems regarding comparability, focusing on three aspects; (i) the problem of a proper scale; (ii) the problem of a proper aggregation of conflicting criteria and (iii) the debate whether values are subjective or objective.  The debate regarding incomparability is varied and intense making a perfunctory or uncritical acceptance of comparativism wrong.  However, Saatian Comparativism will be shown to be a solution to the major issues raised by incomparativists.  Two conclusions are reached; (i) Saaty’s (2011) view is confirmed and (ii) the work of Saaty is not reflected in the incomparability or incommensurability literature and this debate stands to be enriched by seriously considering Saatian Comparativism.

How to Cite

von Solms, S. (2015). COMPARABILITY, DECISION THEORY AND THE AHP. International Journal of the Analytic Hierarchy Process, 7(3). https://doi.org/10.13033/ijahp.v7i3.313

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Keywords

Analytic Hierarchy Process, Covering Value, Incomparability, Incommensurability, Value Realism.

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